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Abstract 
 
We propose a simple model that captures the link between bank and sovereign credit risk. It allows 
evaluating policy options to address this ‘doom loop’ in which the government may need to raise debt 
to recapitalise banks, and an increase in government debt raises sovereign risk and in turn generates 
potential bank losses via their (sovereign) bond holdings. Hence, an initial shock originating either in 
the banking or sovereign sector is amplified by the feedback relation. We set up a framework based 
on detailed actual bank balance sheets and test the model on 35 large EU banking groups, across 7 
European countries. The effects of the feedback loops in most cases more than double the effect of 
the initial shock on bank losses and the sovereign risk premium. We show that a single EU bank 
resolution mechanism, European Stability Mechanism (ESM) direct bank recapitalisations, and 
bondholder “bail-in” can be effective to dampen the bank-sovereign loop. Addressing the home bias 
in banks sovereign bond holdings by reducing excessive exposure to domestic sovereigns has only 
limited benefit in terms of lower crisis doom loop effects as contagion effects increase. 
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1. Introduction 
The euro-area sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the strong link between banks and sovereign credit 
risk, its circular nature and the fact that interconnections are multiple and complex.  
On one side, banks are adversely affected by sovereign credit risk deterioration via multiple channels, 
including directly through their exposure to sovereign bonds (see Panetta (2012), Merler and Pisany-
Ferry (2012)). Banks in the euro area are particularly exposed to sovereign bonds. Total exposure of 
the EBA-covered large banking groups in the euro area to sovereign debt amounts to 25-40% of 
home country GDP in most countries. Moreover, a surprisingly strong home bias to sovereign debt of 
their home country leads to a strong link from sovereign risk to banking risk within countries.   
On the other side, sovereign creditworthiness is crucially affected by the health of the banking sector. 
The most obvious way banking system stress spills over to sovereigns is through the perceived cost 
of bank rescues raising government debt. This became obvious during the Irish and Spanish crises 
when despite relatively low starting levels of government debt, the sovereign risk premia rose 
dramatically as the banking sector came under stress. Further channels include the potential impact 
of a weak banking sector on credit availability, private sector interest rates and thus GDP growth.  
These multiple feedback loops may lead to an unstable system in which an initial shock, originating 
either in the banking or sovereign sector, is amplified with dramatic effects on the real economy. For 
this reason various policy tools, to break this so-called “vicious cycle” have been proposed in the 
financial supervision and macro-prudential regulation debate, such as ESM direct recapitalization1, 
bondholder bail-in, a single bank resolution fund, deposit guarantee schemes.2  
We propose a basic stylised model that captures the link between bank and sovereign credit risk and 
allows evaluating alternative policy options. Our main modelling contribution is to extend a basic 
version of the Mody-Sandri (2012) framework so that sovereign risk affects the health of banks 
through their sovereign bond holdings. A calibrated debt-default threshold allows endogenously 
                                                 
1
 The ESM direct recapitalisation instrument (DRI) was introduced in December 2014. It will in future be replaced by the ESM 
backstopping the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), as decided at the 14 December 2018 Euro Summit. The European Council explicitly 
states that the objective of the DRI is help break the banking-sovereign loop: “The objective of an ESM direct recapitalisation shall be 
to preserve the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States in line with Article 3 of the ESM Treaty, and to 
help remove the risk of contagion from the financial sector to the sovereign by allowing the recapitalisation of institutions directly.” DRI 
may be used in very specific circumstances to directly recapitalise financial institutions, as a last resort instrument when all other 
instruments, including bail-in as mandated by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), have been applied and after the 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) has been used.  
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/137569.pdf.  
2
 The EU single resolution mechanism’s (SRM) objective is to allow resolving banks with minimal costs to public finances and the real 
economy by requiring bondholder bail-in and establishing a single resolution fund. It will apply to all banks in the euro area and other 
Member States that decide to participate. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-570_en.htm?locale=en. 
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determining sovereign credit risk as the government issues new debt to recapitalise banks to their 
minimum regulatory levels when banks face stress conditions and large unexpected losses. The 
sovereign feedback loop raises bank losses further, triggering further recapitalisations.3 Thus, we 
capture the circular nature of banking and sovereign sector credit risk.  
Our aim is to analyse the feedback loop effects triggered by a banking sector shock as in the euro-
area sovereign debt crisis and to evaluate alternative policy options to break the loop. We simulate 
banking sector losses with a micro-simulation model of systemic banking stress based on actual bank 
balance sheets as in De Lisa et al. (2011). The loss distribution of each bank reflects the credit risk 
implied by its regulatory capital requirement on the basis of the Basel II FIRB (Foundation Internal 
Ratings Based) formula, which is commonly used to analyses banks' riskiness by regulators.  
We investigate the link between bank and sovereign risk within countries, and cross-border spillover 
effects as banks are internationally exposed to sovereign debt. We then apply the model in some 
scenario analyses illustrating how different policy measures contribute to reducing the adverse 
feedback loop. These measures include ESM direct recapitalization, a single resolution fund, 
bondholder bail-in and limiting home bias of sovereign exposures.  
In the remainder of the paper, we consecutively discuss related literature, present the model, the data, 
and the results of our analysis, before we conclude.    
2. Related Literature 
Following the euro area debt sovereign crisis there is a growing literature on the relation between 
banks and sovereign credit risk. Panetta et al (2011) discuss anecdotally the main transmission 
channels through which sovereign risk affects banks funding. They suggest that  banks are negatively 
affected by sovereign credit risk as (a) the value of their assets reduces (government bonds); (b) they 
face liquidity issues as the value of collateral used to get funding from the central bank reduces; (c) 
the country’s banks rating tends to be downgraded together with the sovereign (sovereign debt 
ceiling); (d) government guarantees are perceived to weaken, reducing any rating uplift;  (e) banks 
tend to be exposed to banks and firms in other countries which in turn are exposed to sovereign debt 
(international spillovers); (f) an increase in sovereign credit risk might trigger a generalized decline in 
asset prices in a country affecting both bank and non-financial firms (risk aversion channel); (g) banks 
                                                 
3
 Formally, the impact of the deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness on bank capital depends on how banks account for 
government bonds in their balance sheet. In our modeling exercise we consider that market evaluation of bank capital takes sovereign 
risk fully into account even if regulatory capital does not.   
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tend to have lower (non-interest) income in recessions; and finally (h) banks suffer from crowding-
out effects due to sovereign debt issuance.   
Dieckmann and Plank (2011) study the default risk of advanced economies. Their results show that 
higher pre-crisis exposure of a country to its financial sector is associated with a higher sovereign 
CDS spread, moreover they show that a deteriorating state of the financial sector is associated with 
a larger sovereign CDS spread, that the association between the financial sector and the sovereign 
CDS spread is magnified in the post-crisis and, moreover, that EMU countries exhibit stronger 
sensitivity to the financial sector. 
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl (2013) model the loop between bank and sovereign risk. They propose 
a model in which the government can finance a bailout through increased taxation, at the cost of 
reducing the incentives of the non-financial sector to invest and via dilution of existing government 
debt holders, leading to a deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness. Also, sovereign credit risk feeds 
back into the financial sector. In the empirical analysis they document that post-bailout changes in 
sovereign CDS explain bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank level determinants of 
credit spreads, providing evidence of the sovereign bank loop.  
Mody-Sandri (2012) present a model which illustrates the impact of financial shocks on sovereign 
credit spreads. In the Mody-Sandri model, the government is assumed to default when the debt-to-
GDP ratio approaches a threshold level. Sovereign credit risk is thus directly determined by the 
dynamics of both GDP and government debt. GDP is affected, among other factors, by the amount of 
bank capital determining provision of credit for investment in the economy. This model considers 
exclusively one direction of the risk transmission, namely the one from the banking to the government 
sector and is, therefore, useful to analyse situations in which a banking crisis might cause sovereign 
debt crisis. In case of a banking crisis, the government faces a tradeoff between increases in gross 
debt (to recapitalize banks) and a fall in GDP due to a reduction of banks capital and hence 
investment4.  
Galliani and Zedda (2013) discuss the role of the bail-in in breaking the vicious cycle of banks and 
public finance distress. In their analysis they focus on four small European countries (BE, DK, GR, NL) 
and they assume5 that the banking sector shock feeds into the government deficit (i.e. governments 
                                                 
4 When banks are in trouble the government has to inject new funds otherwise these reduce lending to the real economy. If the GDP 
declines the debt-to-GDP ratio increases and this generates an increase of sovereign credit risk. Sovereign credit risk may increase also 
when the government issues new debt to recapitalize banks. Hence, there is a trade-off when doing the bail-out. 
5
 They also assume a reaction coefficient for the sovereign risk premium for every percent increase in the deficit that leads to haircuts 
on banks’ sovereign debt holdings. This coefficient may significantly overestimate the effects, as one-off increases in the deficit due 
to bank recapitalization are assumed to generate a similar impact on the risk premium as a structural increase in the deficit.  
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are subject only to a one-off shock in case of bank recapitalization). However, not all recapitalisation 
can be assumed to feed into the deficit, as most of it often is a financial transaction.6 To overcome 
these issues we model the spill-over from bank to sovereign risk through the government debt channel 
instead of the deficit.  
3. Modelling the Bank-Sovereign Loop  
Section 3.1. discusses an extension to the Mody-Sandri (2012) framework. We add the government 
debt increase due to bank recapitalisation to the model to get an impact on the sovereign credit risk 
premium. Bank recapitalization takes places whenever banks face severe distress and fail to meet 
regulatory requirements. We apply a ‘Haircut’ to government bond holdings by banks according to the 
sovereign credit risk premium effect and EBA information on actual banks’ exposure to sovereign 
debt. Section 3.2 discusses the micro-simulation model of systemic banking sector losses that we use 
to generate banking losses using actual bank balance sheets. We build a multi-country framework 
which allows analysing how the amplification mechanisms plays out and evaluating several policy 
options to break the loop between bank and sovereign credit risk in the euro area. 
3.1. The Model 
In our stylized two-period model, the government issues, in period 1, an amount of bonds B0, offering 
an expected rate of return r. The government also issues new debt to recapitalize banks in distress, 
i.e. when banks fall short of capital below the required regulatory level, so that the total outstanding 
government debt is  
B1 = B0 + Bank Recap (1) 
Banks distress is in a first stage due to the losses faced on lending activity to the real economy. 
Subsequently, as in our model government debt depreciation is related to recapitalization needs as 
result of the initial banking sector losses, bank distress can be due to losses faced on government 
bonds holdings. The ability of the government to repay this debt, in period 2, depends on the debt-to-
GDP ratio as given by 
      (2) 
                                                 
6
 For example, if banks initial capital is EUR 2 billion and the bank suffers losses amounting to EUR 3 billion, the government needs to 
cover EUR 1 billion of losses in excess of capital. This translates into a one-off deficit increase. The remaining EUR 2 billion 
recapitalisation to the regulatory minimum is recorded as financial transaction and only increases the government gross debt and not 
the deficit.      
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where B2 = B1(1+r)    (3) 
The government is assumed to default whenever b2 exceeds a threshold level7 =debtmax .  
GDP (Y) is determined by:  
   (3) 
where K1 is capital invested in the economy by the banking sector at time 1, A1 is the level of 
productivity of the economy, g is the growth rate and is a mean-one log-normally distributed shock 
with standard deviation . The banking sector determines the capital investment K1. Banks leverage 
their equity E1 so that  where lambda is the leverage factor. Hence, a reduction of banks 
capitalization reduces investments in the real economy having an adverse effect on GDP.  
The government (risk-neutral) probability of default is: 
 (4) 
To compensate for the government’s risk of default, risk neutral investors require a premium over the 
risk-free interest rate Rf. Hence, for no-arbitrage reasons the expected return (r) on government bonds 
has to satisfy the following relation 
  (5) 
where LGD is loss given default (1-recovery rate). The realization of a sufficiently large negative GDP 
shock, , drives the debt-to-GDP ratio above the threshold, hence to default. Features of the economy 
such as lower capital productivity, lower total factor productivity growth, higher GDP volatility ( ) 
would increase default risk. Also, default thresholds can be affected by changes in global liquidity, 
                                                 
7 This captures the idea from models à la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) where a risk-averse sovereign endogenously decides to default 
in order to smooth consumption. The sovereign incentive to default is higher during recessions and when facing a large debt burden, 
i.e. when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high, as in these circumstances, avoiding debt repayments is an expedient to sustain consumption 
despite falling GDP.   
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risk aversion or country-specific risk shocks (e.g. political risks). All this parameters are kept fixed in 
our model so that Y2( ).  
3.2 Calibration 
The benchmark calibration is summarized as follows and is based on values in Mody-Sandri (2012). 
Parameters are on an annualized basis, but note that as we focus on 10-year benchmark bonds these 
values are consistent with a 10 horizon. The standard deviation of the GDP shock is set to 20%8, the 
default recovery rate to 80%, the risk-free rate to  2%, capital productivity to 10%, productivity growth 
to 0, banking sector leverage to 10 and equity to 100; this is set to 100 so that k1 is 10009 and that 
the expected GDP is equal to 100.  
Parameter Description Value 
σ STD of GDP shock 20% 
μ Bond recovery rate 80% 
i Risk-free rate 2% 
A Capital Productivity 10% 
g Productivity Growth 0% 
K1 Bank capital 100 
debtmax Default threshold Calibrated 
   
 
Debtmax is calibrated on a country basis so as to match the actual credit spread (CDS premium) 
observed for each government by end 2012. We perform sensitivity analysis by calculating debtmax  
for each country in different years with different observed debt-to-GDP ratio and CDS premia. We 
find that even if  debtmax  tends to differ across countries (IT, IE, PT approx. 160%, DE, FR, NL, SP 
approx. 110-120%) it is relatively stable over time. 
                                                 
8 This number might seem quite large, but note that the price of a 10 year bond incorporates instantaneously the changes in 
expectations of the debt sustainability and thus GDP dynamics in the long run. Growth paths change dramatically in a financial crisis. 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) report that for example for Italy the output loss from in the period 2008-2012 has been approximately of 
32% and for some other euro area countries much more. 
9 As bank capital is set to be 100 and the leverage 10 the total capital provision to the real economy by banks is 1000. 
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3.3. Banking Sector Distress 
We model banking sector distress as a tail realisation (corresponding approximately to the amount of 
losses and recapitalization needs observed in the 2008 crisis) of a simulated distribution of bank’s 
excess losses, which we obtain by mean of the so called Systemic Model of Banking Originated Losses 
(SYMBOL).10 11 
SYMBOL simulates the distribution of losses in excess of banks’ capital within a banking system by 
aggregating individual banks' losses by country. Individual banks' losses are generated via Monte 
Carlo simulation using the Basel FIRB loss distribution function, which is commonly used to analyse 
banks' riskiness by regulators.12 This function is in turn based on the Vasicek model (see Vasicek, 
2002), which in broad terms extends the Merton model (see Merton, 1974) to a portfolio of 
borrowers.13 The loss distribution of each bank is calibrated on an estimate of the average default 
probability of its portfolio of assets, which is derived from the ratio of the banks' Minimum Capital 
Requirements and its Total Assets (TA). 
The model operates in four steps: the first step consist is estimating the average default probability 
for the loans of any individual bank, by means of the features of the Basel FIRB function; the second 
in numerically generating the bank’s excess losses and capital reduction. The third step consists in 
checking which banks are in default. Finally, the fourth step in obtaining the distribution of aggregate 
losses at the country level.14 
Details of the four steps are as follows: 
                                                 
10
 The model is introduced in De Lisa et al. (2011) without the SYMBOL acronym, which was adopted at a later stage. 
11 Note that Galliani and Zedda (2013) also start from a SYMBOL generated banking sector shock to analyse the effects on sovereign 
risk premia. 
12
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005, 2006 and 2011. 
13
 The Basel Committee permits banks a choice between two broad methodologies for calculating their capital requirements for credit 
risk. One alternative, the Standardised Approach, measures credit risk in a standardised manner, supported by external credit 
assessments. The alternative is the Internal Rating-Based (IRB) approach which allows institutions to use their own internal rating-
based measures for key drivers of credit risk as primary inputs to the capital calculation. Institutions using the Foundation IRB (FIRB) 
approach are allowed to determine the borrowers’ probabilities of default while those using the Advanced IRB (AIRB) approach are 
permitted to rely on own estimates of all risk components related to their borrowers (e.g. loss given default and exposure at default). 
The Basel FIRB capital requirement formula specified by the Basel Committee for credit risk is the Vasicek model for credit portfolio 
losses, default values for all parameters except obligors’ probabilities of default are provided in the regulatory framework. On the Basel 
FIRB approach, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005, 2006 and 2010 rev. 2011.  
14
 It should be noted that in other applications, an additional optional step simulating direct bank-to-bank contagion is introduced 
between steps 3 and 4 described here. 
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● STEP 1: Estimation of the Implied Obligors’ Probability of Default (IOPD) of the portfolio of each 
individual bank. 
The model estimates the average IOPD of the portfolio of each individual bank using its total MCR15 
declared in the balance sheet by numerical inversion of the Basel FIRB formula for credit risk. 
Individual bank data needed to estimate the IOPD are banks' RWA and TA, which can be derived from 
the balance sheet data. All other parameters are set to their regulatory default values. Annex 2 gives 
additional technical details on the FIRB formula for the interested reader. 
● STEP 2: Simulation of correlated losses for the banks in the system.   
Given the estimated average IOPD, it is assumed that correlated losses hitting banks can be simulated 
via Monte Carlo using the same FIRB formula and imposing a correlation structure among banks (with 
a correlation set to R=50%). This correlation exists either as a consequence of the banks’ common 
exposure to the same borrower or, more generally, to a particular common influence of the business 
cycle16. In each simulation run j, losses for bank i are simulated as: 
𝐿𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∙ 𝑁 [√
1
1 − 𝑅
𝑁−1(𝐼𝑂𝑃𝐷𝑖) + √
𝑅
1− 𝑅
𝑁−1(𝛼𝑖,𝑗)] 
where N is the normal distribution function, N−1(α i,j) are correlated normal random shocks, and IOPDi 
is the average implied obligors’ probability of default estimated for each bank in Step 1. LGD is the 
Loss Given Default, set as in Basel regulation to 45%. 
● STEP 3: Determination of the default event. 
Given the matrix of correlated losses, it is determined which banks fail. As illustrated in Figure 1, a 
bank default happens when simulated obligor portfolio losses exceed the sum of the expected losses 
(EL) and the total actual capital (K) given by the sum of its MCR plus the bank’s excess capital, if any: 
𝐿𝑛,𝑖 ≥ 𝐸𝐿𝑖 + 𝐾𝑖 
                                                 
15
 Banks must comply with capital requirements not only for their lending activity and credit risk component. Banks assets are in fact 
not only made up of loans, and there are capital requirements that derive from market risk, counterparty risk, and operational risk, etc. 
The main assumption currently behind this methodology is that all risk can be approximated as credit risk.  
16
 The choice of the 50% correlation is based on Sironi and Zazzara, 2004. A discussion and a sensitivity check on this assumption can 
be found in De Lisa et al., 2011. 
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The green-shaded area in Figure 1 represents the region where losses are covered by provisions and 
total capital, while the red-shaded one shows when banks default under the above definition. It should 
be noted that the probability density function of losses for an individual bank is skewed to the right, 
i.e. there is a very small probability of extremely large losses and a high probability of losses that are 
closer to the average/expected loss. The Basel Value at Risk (VaR) corresponds to a confidence level 
of 0.1%, i.e. the MCR covers losses from the obligors’ portfolio with probability 99.9%. This percentile 
falls in the green-shaded area as banks generally hold an excess capital buffer on top of the MCR.  
Figure 1: Individual bank loss probability density function 
 
● STEP 4: Aggregated distribution of losses for the whole system. 
Aggregate losses are obtained by summing losses in excess of capital plus potential recapitalisation 
needs of all distressed banks in the system (i.e. both failed and undercapitalised banks) in each 
simulation run. 
In order to compute losses increasing outstanding debt, we consider the amount of funds necessary 
to recapitalize all banks to a 4.5% or an 8% level of RWA. 
These two different levels are chosen as follows: 8% is the level of minimum capitalization under 
which a bank is considered viable under Basel rules and the minimum level to which banks were 
recapitalized by public interventions in the past crisis; on the other hand it could be considered that 
banks do not need to be fully recapitalized by public finances money if they still hold a certain amount 
of capital which could allow them to access the markets or other sources of financing. We therefore 
consider a recapitalisation to 4.5% of the RWA of each bank, a level which coincides with the minimum 
10 
 
amount of Core Tier 1 capital and with the minimum capitalization level required to access direct 
recapitalization by ESM. 17 
3.4. Modelling issues 
The following points should be considered when reading the results. First, in our modelling exercise 
we consider that the market evaluation of bank capital takes sovereign risk fully into account even if 
regulatory capital does not.  Formally, the impact of the deterioration in the sovereign creditworthiness 
on bank capital depends on how banks account for government bonds in their balance sheet. A 
reduction in the market value of sovereign bond holdings that are held in the banking book at 
amortised costs are not marked-to-market and do not formally affect banks’ regulatory capital until 
realisation of losses. When held in the trading book, available-for-sale and in the fair value option 
book, sovereign holdings directly impact the capital of banks.18 Second, we ignore interest rate risk 
and we focus only on the credit risk component of government bond yields. Government bonds are all 
assumed to have a 10-year maturity. Third, we ignore other financial intermediaries than banks, as 
no information is so far available on the exposures of other (non-banks) investors to the considered 
government bonds. These investors are most likely investment and pension funds and insurance 
companies. Fourth, our bank distress micro-simulation model does not take into account the rating of 
the bank, eventual provisions or the possibility that banks can raise capital. Fifth, we take into account 
that sovereign risk might spillover cross-border. However, we do not take into account possible 
systemic effects of contagion between banks via the interbank market or due to fire sales and liquidity 
spirals; 
Finally, in our framework, investment is not related to the rate paid on borrowed funds, but this 
realistically will be the case. Therefore, investment and growth would decline.  
4. Data  
Data are taken from several sources. Sovereign debt exposures amounts of a sample of banks which 
participated in the 2012 European Banking Authority (EBA) capital exercise19 are taken from SNL 
                                                 
17 According to the agreement reached in June 2013, banks with a capital below 4.5% of RWA would have to receive help from their 
own government before the ESM can step in via direct recapitalisation. ESM direct bank recapitalisation instrument 
http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/436873/20130621-ESM-direct-recaps-main-features.pdf 
18
 As of June 2013 this is the average distribution (across the EBA sample) of sovereign exposures: 48% is held in the “available for 
sale portfolio”, 30% in the “hold to maturity”, 18% in the “held for trading” and 4% is marked under the “fair value option”. Only for the 
last two categories holdings have to be reported at the marked-to-market value.  We believe market valuations of sovereign bonds 
reflect expectations about risks of sovereign default, about bank recap needs, including the sovereign feedback loops. Sovereign and 
bank capital and bank funding conditions will reflect these market expectations about default risks and expected losses. 
19 Greek banks were not included in the EBA exercise because already subject of specific measures within the EU/IMF financial 
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Financial. Banks Balance sheet data from Bankscope as of December 2012. In particular, for the 
analysis of capital levels and for bank losses estimations we use the variables: capital requirements, 
total capital and total assets. Country level macroeconomic variables such as amount of government 
debt outstanding and GDP are taken from Datastream. Sovereign CDS Premia have 10 years maturity 
and are taken from Markit. These data are summarized at the country level in Table 1.  
Table 1: Macro Variables, Banks’ Total Assets and Sovereign Debt Exposures. Observations are as of December 2012. The 
table aggregates per country the data for the considered 35 banks consolidated in the country of the parent. The selected Euro area 
countries, in the analysis, are: Germany (DE), France (FR), Netherlands (NL), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES). Total 
government bond holdings includes bonds issued by all worldwide governments. 
        Government Bond Holdings 
            
   GDP 
Government 
Debt 
Outstanding 
Amount 
Debt to GDP 
Ratio 
 Sovereign 
CDS Level 
 Total Asset  
Banking Sector  
 
 Total as 
% GDP 
 Total as % of 
Total Assets  
Share of Domestic  
on Total Holdings 
Share of Exposure 
to the 7 Selected 
Countries 
  Billion  € Billion €  Bps Billion €      
DE  2.666 2.161 81,0% 78 8.435  37% 11,8% 55,9% 70,2% 
FR  2.032  1.841  90,6% 139 7.908   25% 6,5% 34,3% 58,8% 
NL  599  427  71,3% 78 2.528   33% 7,9% 38,0% 67,9% 
IE  164  193  117,4% 250 903   35% 6,3% 82,5% 92,7% 
IT  1.567  1.990  127,0% 313 4.247   37% 13,7% 69,0% 81,6% 
PT  165  205  124,1% 471 560   38% 11,3% 77,2% 84,4% 
SP  1.029  885  86,0% 319 3.587   39% 11,2% 58,3% 64,4% 
            
 
Debt to GDP ratios diverge substantially across “core” (DE 81%, FR 90% and NL 71%) and “peripheral” 
countries (IE 117%, IT 127 90%, PT 124% and SP 86%), meaning that for the latter group public 
finances are substantially weaker. This aspect is also captured by higher sovereign credit spreads of 
the “peripheral” countries as measured by the 10-year maturity Credit Default Swap (CDS) Premium, 
which are all above 250 Bps.  Data on exposures show that banks’ overall holdings of government 
debt in percentage of GDP is relatively constant across countries, ranging from 25 to 39% (column 
7). Sovereign exposure constitutes a substantial fraction of banks total assets, ranging from the 6.3% 
of Irish banks to the 13.7% of Italian banks. There is a strong domestic bias in sovereign debt holdings 
as the share of holdings of own sovereign bonds ranges between 34% for French banks to 82% for 
Irish banks (column 11). In the analysis, we study the banks sovereign feedback focusing only on the 
seven selected countries (DE, FR, NL, IE, IT, PT and SP). The exposure of the banks located in these 
selected countries with respect to the same countries ranges between 58 and 92 %. Summary figures 
                                                 
programme. 
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on holdings of government bonds of the countries considered in our analysis are presented in Table 
2. 
German banks are exposed to Italian and Spanish government debt (for an amount of respectively 34 
and 16 Billion Euro). French banks are exposed towards German and Italian debt (respectively 42 and 
38 Billion Euro). In any case, these exposures are negligible with respect to the total amount of bond 
holdings by German and French banks. Dutch banks are largely exposed to German government bonds. 
Irish, Portuguese and Spanish banks are characterized by only minor non-domestic exposures. This 
also holds for Italian banks with the exception of a 30 Billion exposure to German government debt. 
As banks with substantial cross-border sovereign exposure are either those located in countries with 
strong public finances (DE, FR and NL) or those exposed to safe/low-risk government debt (as for the 
case of IT), we expect the results in our analysis to be driven mainly by the domestic sovereign debt 
exposures. 
Table 2: Banks’ Sovereign Bond Holdings. Observations are as of December 2012. In the table, rows show per each country 
Sovereign bond holdings of the considered 35 banks of bonds issued by government-countries in the sample.  
Country FR DE IE IT NL PT SP 
 Billion €       
DE 12,954 312,367 1,411 34,882 10,700 3,477 16,375 
 FR 141,068 42,480 0,931 38,618 10,223 1,241 7,507 
 NL 14,426 29,398 0,175 3,430 62,215 0,620 0,775 
 IE 1,018 0,306 16,283 0,283 0,379 0,025 0,000 
 IT 1,786 30,341 0,053 197,716 0,432 0,203 3,090 
 PT 0,215 0,022 0,581 1,070 0,012 21,938 0,140 
 SP 3,270 4,356 0,000 4,803 0,905 3,324 157,934 
                
To motivate the importance of focusing on the government bond holdings “channel” we calculate 
aggregate figures by country of the “maximum mark-to-market losses” faced by banks due to the 
fact that they were holding government bonds in the 2010-2012 period. These losses are obtained 
based on the banks’ actual government debt holdings in December 201220. The haircut applied is 
based on a credit risk premium increase approximated by the difference between the minimum and 
maximum credit spread observed throughout the considered period21. As shown in Table 3, in the 
considered two-year period, Italian banks where holding 286 Billion euro in government bonds and 
                                                 
20 These are time varying, but tend to be relatively stable in time. 
21 Notice these are not actual realized losses, but can be seen as a sort of upper bound. 
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faced losses for approximately 64 Billion (haircut applied is 24,8 %) corresponding to 3,1% of their 
total assets and to approximately 8,4 % of the Italian GDP.  
Banks in core countries lost on their government bond holdings an amount which corresponds 
approximately to a percentage of their total assets in the order of 1,1 to 1,6%22. Banks in peripheral 
countries realized larger losses, i.e. going from 2,8 to 5,2% of their total assets. 
Table 3: Banks maximum mark-to-market losses on government debt. Data on banks government debt exposure are as of 
December 2012. The table aggregates per country the data for the considered 35 banks consolidated in the country of the parent.  
  CDS Min CDS Max Bond Haircut  
Banks Government 
Bond Holdings  
Total Losses  
Total 
Losses/GDP 
Total Losses/Total 
Assets 
 Bps     Billion €        
DE 29,3 95,25 5,6%  558,280 75,569  5,0% 1,6% 
 FR 37,7 184,23 12,0%  411,110 74,121  4,6% 1,2% 
 NL 29,2 138,5 9,1%  163,449 23,408  4,8% 1,1% 
 IE 118,5 980,6 49,1%  19,730 8,606  15,2% 2,8% 
 IT 89,9 432,6 24,8%  286,187 64,783  8,4% 3,1% 
 PT 98,6 1027 51,9%  28,393 13,112  17,7% 5,2% 
 SP 99,29 366,3 20,0%  270,736 58,876  8,5% 2,4% 
          
 
5. Results of the Analysis 
5.1 The Feed-back Loop  
Our model allows a simulation of the allocation of bank losses across different stakeholders (equity-
holders, bondholders, public finances and safety nets) depending on the chosen regulatory context 
and scenarios for bank capitalization. At this stage, we focus on bank losses affecting public finances, 
we do not consider scenarios in which bondholders are bailed-in, or safety-nets (resolution fund, 
deposit guarantee scheme) cover part of the losses. Losses in excess of capital are financed by public 
finances.  
The shock to which the banking sector is exposed23 is at the euro area level (i.e. we run SYMBOL on 
the pool of 35 banking groups in the EBA sample). The capital injection to recapitalize banks is done 
                                                 
22 This is the maximum mark-to-market loss that have occurred throughout the considered two-year period. This exercise does not 
consider that losses might have been hidden in bank balance sheet or that banks might have been helped in indirect ways by the 
government. 
23  We also conduct a parallel exercise in which there is a shock originating in the sovereign sector and we test how banks react when 
they are in stress conditions (joint banking and sovereign shock). We take as an adverse scenario one in which the term structure of 
credit spreads of all Euro area government shifts unexpectedly by 40% (compared to the baseline where the term structure stays 
constant) and we work out the corresponding sovereign bonds’ haircuts. The actual available capital in case of a haircut on sovereign 
bonds is considered to be proxied as the actual capital of the bank minus the reduction in value of the bonds held on the balance sheet. 
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by the domestic government. The effect of the shock is measured by evaluating the increase in credit 
spread and haircut for the selected Euro area governments and the banks losses on sovereign bond 
holdings. Banks’ losses on government holdings are attributed on the basis of the complete exposure 
matrix.  Through this channel we account for international spillover effects. We analyse two cases, 
one in which the government has to recapitalize banks at the 8% regulatory capital level24 and one in 
which it only has to recapitalize banks to the 4.5% level because the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) would step funding the remaining part.   
The shock to which the banking sector is exposed that is considered in this exercise reflects a 
percentile of the loss distribution from SYMBOL for which bank losses for the EU as a whole are of 
the same order of magnitude as the 2008-2010 financial crisis. This is the 99.95th percentile of the 
loss distribution.25 The initial sovereign risk premium (CDS) is the one prevailing in December 2012. 
This can be considered a period of risk aversion that already reflects high risk of a systemic crisis and 
some risk of a euro area break-up. The debt-to-GDP thresholds calibrated to fit this risk premium may 
thus be rather low historically. Table 4 shows for each country: first SYMBOL generated bank excess 
losses that are to be covered by public finances and the resulting debt increase due to the 
recapitalizations of the banks.  Then its shows the CDS increase and haircut on sovereign bonds due 
to higher debt (and default risk) from our model. The reduced market valuation of banks sovereign 
bond holdings (both domestic and foreign) results in further capital shortfalls and increases in 
countries’ debt. The columns 7-10 report the final results after 5 iterations from bank losses to 
sovereign debt and risk premium increase.  
Let us first consider the most realistic scenario in which the domestic government recapitalizes bank 
to 4.5% as the ESM does provide direct recapitalizations for the remaining part. Results in Table 4 
show that the model generates sizeable effects from the feedback loops, exacerbating the initial 
direct effects of the banking sector shock on the banking sector losses, sovereign debt, risk premia 
and bond haircuts. In the case of Italy for example, the CDS shift is 206 bps, i.e. 115 bps larger than 
the initial shift of 91 bps, the haircut rises from 6.7% to 16.9% and banks losses from 29 to 73 Billion 
                                                 
So, the capital to be considered in the SYMBOL model, for bank i, after the haircut is   . The two analyses are based on banks information 
and on country specific macroeconomic variables as of December 2012. 
24  Recap to 8% reflects a scenario in which no private sector capital can be generated (through equity issuance, or mergers) and the 
ESM does not provide direct recapitalizations. 
25 When considering the relevant loss distributions for individual banks at the 99.95th percentile, after the loss matrix has been 
generated, we first group the banks in the SYMBOL-generated loss matrix per country and then take the loss distribution at the runs of 
the 99.95th percentile for an individual country as we are primarily interested in the sovereign banking doom loop within a single country. 
This contrasts with an approach in which the runs of the 99.95th percentile are taken when all EU banks are taken together. Note that 
in our approach where individual country losses are taken at the 99.95th percentile, the aggregate losses at EU level will be higher than 
those of the 99.95th percentile when taking all EU banks together. Later versions of SYMBOL simulations moreover applied a HP filter 
to smoothen the individual run’s loss distributions for single country losses. 
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Euro. The effect of the loop is not explosive meaning that haircuts, CDS levels and debt to GDP ratios 
tend to stabilise around some equilibrium value. 
Table 4: Banking Sector Shock and the Total Effect on Banks Losses and Sovereign Risk. This table shows results of the 
analysis in which we estimate the total effect, accounting for the complete feedback loop, of a shock originating in the banking sector 
on both banks and sovereign credit risk.  The following information is reported: SYMBOL excess losses (99.95 percentile of the 
distribution) and the corresponding debt-to-GDP increments (relative to its initial value), sovereign risk premium shifts, haircuts and 
losses on sovereign holdings. The table aggregates per country the data for the considered 35 banks consolidated in the country of the 
parent. Public finances (i.e. domestic government) provide for the recapitalization up to 4.5% RWA. 
    First order effect   Total Effect 
  
  
 Debt-to-
GDP 
Increment 
Shift 
Sovereign CDS 
Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
  
 Debt-to-
GDP 
Increment 
Shift 
Sovereign 
CDS Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
Banks Excess 
Losses + gov. 
recap 
  Billion  €    Bps   Billion  €      Bps   Billion  €  
DE 44,803 1,70% 20 1,70% 22,581   4,20% 55 6,60% 68,168 
 FR 78,921 3,90% 64 5,20% 18,435   6,00% 105 10,50% 43,100 
 NL 22,661 3,80% 55 4,60% 7,128   6,90% 119 11,50% 18,492 
 IE 12,929 7,90% 171 12,50% 6,179   16,20% 391 27,70% 13,667 
 IT 70,271 4,50% 91 6,70% 29,466   9,20% 206 16,90% 73,907 
 PT 13,085 7,90% 242 15,80% 8,109   18,60% 556 33,60% 17,556 
 SP 70,401 6,80% 235 16,30% 39,953   15,80% 605 37,40% 92,413 
            
 
As the debt to GDP ratio increases one could ex-ante have expected sovereign risk to explode, but as 
haircuts increase, the value at risk reduces sharply. The potential increase in the sovereign debt as 
result of bank losses on sovereign debt holdings is effectively capped by the total amount of sovereign 
debt holdings. As long as the sum of the countries’ initial debt, the banking sector losses generated 
by SYMBOL and the countries’ banks’ sovereign debt holdings are lower than the debt threshold, the 
premium and the haircut will stabilize at a level that does not reflect a certain default. If in a later 
stage additional feedback loops will be added to the model dynamics, instability and explosive 
patterns may arise more easily, in particular through the growth channel. The importance of the 
feedback loop differs across countries. The main factors driving the dynamics are: the characteristics 
of the domestic banking sector, the initial debt to GDP ratio, the initial sovereign risk premium, and 
the banks holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. In particular, the size of the banking sector to GDP, 
the riskiness of the assets (RWA to TA), and the capitalisation of the banks. All these ingredients 
determine the size of the initial banking sector losses. Notice that the feedback loops are relatively 
benign in France and Germany, and very important in Spain, Portugal and Ireland.  Table 5 shows the 
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dynamics of the key variables over a number of loops26. The effects level off significantly after the 
second loop and stabilizes after 4 loops.  
Table 5: Banking Sector Shock and the Feedback Loop. This table shows the feedback loop dynamics for the first 5 iterations, of 
a shock originating in the banking sector on: haircuts, debt-to-GDP ratios and shift in the sovereign CDS level. In table A Public finances 
(domestic government) provide for the recapitalization up to 4.5% RWA while in Table B for the recapitalization up to 8% of RWA. 
 
The system stabilizes earlier with larger initial shocks. This is the result of two countervailing forces. 
On the one hand the risk premium increase accelerates as debt gets closer to the default threshold. 
On the other had the scope for further losses is reduced as the market value of sovereign debt 
holdings is reduced due to losses in earlier loops. The relatively strong dynamics of Spain when 
compared to Portugal are surprising considering the lower debt-to-GDP ratio. This may be due to the 
high risk premium on Spain compared to the initial debt level by end 2012.  
5.2 The ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation 
If all capital in excess of 4.5% RWA is provided for by ESM direct recap, the sovereign feedback loop 
is significantly weakened.  
                                                 
26 Table 11 and 12 in Annex 1 provide the results as in Table 3 and 5, but for a scenario in which the initial shock originates both in 
the banking and in the sovereign sector. 
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Table 6: The Effect of the ESM intervention on the Feed-Back Loop. This table reports recapitalization effort done by the 
government due to the SYMBOL excess losses (99.95 percentile of the distribution). In the first case public finances (i.e. domestic 
government) provide for the recapitalization up to 8 RWA, while in the second case public finances (i.e. domestic government) provide 
for the recapitalization up to 4.5% RWA as the remaining part to reach the 8% required regulatory level is integrated by the ESM. 
   
Banks excess losses  
+ gov. recap 
 to 8% 
Banks excess losses  
+ gov. recap 
 to 4.5% ESM Funds Injection 
Reduction of losses on 
Government Bond Holdings (in 
case ESM intervenes) 
      
  Billion € Billions € Billion € Billion € 
DE  76,948 44,803 32,145 33,131 
 FR  129,962 78,921 51,041 25,976 
 NL  (         38,052         -                22,661   )         = 15,391 13,263 
 IE  21,843 12,929 8,914 7,318 
 IT  119,247 70,271 48,977 35,709 
 PT  22,366 13,085 9,281 5,980 
 SP   119,873 70,400 49,473 34,219 
 
As an example, in the case of the Netherlands the amount of recapitalization to be covered by the 
Dutch government could be reduced from EUR 38.1 billion to EUR 22.7 billion, as the ESM could cover 
EUR 15.4 billion recap. As a result, the sovereign CDS is estimated to increase by 119 bps rather than 
247 bps (as reported in Table 4), lowering losses on sovereign holdings due to feedback loops by EUR 
13.3 billion (from EUR 31.8 billion to EUR 18.5 billion). For other countries the loss reduction, due to 
ESM fund injection, is substantial as well. Notice that while part of government injections constitutes 
a loss, the ESM injection is an equity investment.  An additional benefit, not considered in our model, 
consists in the lower interest rate that the government will have to pay on the outstanding debt. 
5.3. Banks Losses due to International Exposures 
In the model, government debt depreciation affects banks cross-border. For example, as German 
banks are exposed for approximately 34 Billion to the Italian government debt these will face losses 
whenever Italian Government debt depreciates.  In order to quantify banks losses due to international 
spillovers we proceed as follows. We assume in one case (1) that banks are exposed only to national 
government bonds, i.e. we run the model “blocking” the “cross-border transmission channel and we 
compare the results with the baseline case (i.e. the case developed in Chart B in Table 5 where 
recapitalisation by the national government is at 8%).  
Table 7: Banking Sector Shock and the Total Effect on Banks Losses and Sovereign Risk. This table shows results of the 
analysis in which we estimate the total effect, accounting for the complete feedback loop, of a shock originating in the banking sector 
on both banks and sovereign credit risk.  The following information is reported: debt-to-GDP increments (relative to its initial value), 
sovereign risk premium shifts, haircuts and losses on sovereign holdings. The table aggregates per country the data for the considered 
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35 banks consolidated in the country of the parent. Public finances (i.e. domestic government) provide for the recapitalization up to 8% 
of RWA. In Case 1 banks are exposed only to their home government bonds. 
SYMBOL output: Banks excess losses + gov. recap to 8% (99.95 percentile of the distribution) 
 Baseline Case  -Total Effect   Case 1 -Total Effect 
 
 Debt-to-GDP 
Increment 
Shift 
Sovereign CDS 
Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
    
 Debt-to-GDP 
Increment 
Shift Sovereign CDS 
Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
  Bps  Billion €       Billion €  
DE 6,7% 102 10,2% 101,299   4,3% 59 6,9%  38,797 
 FR 9,8% 196 16,9%  69,076   7,5% 139 12,9%  23,259 
 NL 11,6% 247 20,5%  31,755   8,1% 151 13,9%  10,614 
 IE 26,1% 704 42,0%  20,984   25,1% 677 40,9%  19,380 
 IT 14,6% 344 24,7% 109,616   13,7% 330 24,0%  95,801 
 PT 27,8% 864 45,0%  23,535   26,6% 838 44,1%  21,602 
 SP 24,0% 991 51,3% 126,632     23,2% 959 50,3%  118,516 
 
For peripheral countries the increment of banks losses due to international sovereign exposure is 
negligible. As an example for Italy the difference across the two scenarios is of about 14 billion Euro. 
As a result of this, the debt-to-GDP ratio increment is only of 0,9% (from 13,7 to 14,6%), while the 
CDS premium increment is of 14 bps (from 330 to 344 bps). Differently, for Germany, France and the 
Netherlands initial banks’ losses are substantial. In the case of Germany banks losses increase from 
38 to 101 Billion Euro and the sovereign CDS spread shift (102 bps) is double, but notice that the 
debt-to-gdp ratio remains negligible, i.e. it goes only from 4,3 to 6,7%. Overall, international spillover 
effects have a negligible impact. This was expected given that banks are mainly exposed to national 
government bonds. And that core countries’ banks which are the most exposed to peripheral countries 
benefit from the solid public finances.  
5.4. Bank Exposure: The Full Integration Case 
In this section we perform an exercise where banks are assumed to hold an amount of government 
bonds issued by a country proportional to the share of the debt of the selected country on the total 
bonds hold by all banks. The idea is to challenge the “home bias”. The total amount invested in 
government bonds issued by each country, by any given bank, corresponds to the sum of the actual 
holdings found in the EBA matrix. Results are compared against the benchmark case developed in 
Chart A in table 5 where recapitalisation by the national government is at 4.5%). 
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Table 8: Banking Sector Shock and the Total Effect on Banks Losses and Sovereign Risk. This table shows results of the 
analysis in which we estimate the total effect, accounting for the complete feedback loop, of a shock originating in the banking sector 
on both banks and sovereign credit risk.  The following information is reported: debt-to-GDP increments (relative to its initial value), 
sovereign risk premium shifts, haircuts and losses on sovereign holdings. The table aggregates per country the data for the considered 
35 EU banks consolidated in the country of the parent. Public finances (i.e. domestic government) provide for the recapitalization up to 
4.5% of RWA.  
  SYMBOL output: Banks excess losses + gov. recap to 4.5% (99.95 percentile of the distribution)  Baseline 
   First Order Effect   Total Effect  
Actual 
Exposures 
 
 
Bank excess 
losses + gov. 
recap 
 Debt-to- 
GDP 
Increment 
Shift 
Sovereign CDS 
Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
 
 Debt-to-
GDP 
Increment 
Shift 
Sovereign 
CDS Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
  Billion €   Bps  Billion €    Bps  Billion €   Billion €  
DE  76,948  2,9% 35 3,0% 77,358   8,6% 138 12,9% 152,034   101,299  
 FR  129,962  6,4% 115 9,1% 33,659   9,7% 196 16,9% 66,152   69,076  
 NL  38,052  6,3% 110 9,0% 15,097   11,3% 245 20,3% 29,670   31,755  
 IE  21,843  13,3% 313 21,3% 5,886   20,4% 530 34,6% 11,568   20,984  
 IT  119,247  7,6% 164 11,6% 52,866   14,2% 340 24,5% 103,899   109,616  
 PT  22,366  13,5% 395 24,0%  5,935   20,6% 647 37,3% 11,664   23,535  
 SP  119,873  11,6% 434 27,6%  28,680   17,1% 671 40,1%  56,366   126,632  
     
Sum 219,481    Sum 431,353  482,897 
 
Compared to the baseline case German bank have larger losses on sovereign holdings (152 vs. 101 
Billions), but other countries have either comparable losses (France, Netherlands and Italy) or 
substantially lower losses as in the case of Ireland, Portugal and Spain. In the full integration case, 
total losses amount to around 430 Billion, i.e. approximately 50 Billion less than in the baseline case 
(483 Billions). Notice that losses on sovereign holdings in the first round (219 Billions) are equal across 
the baseline exercise and this application meaning that the 50 Billion reduction in losses is due to 
lower feed-back loop effects. The benefits come from the fact that losses are reallocated to banks in 
Germany that benefit from stronger public finances. The non-linear relation between debt-to-GDP 
ratio and the default risk is flatter for countries where distance to default is higher. This exercises 
shows that there are limited benefit of having a “full integration”.  
5.5. Bank Bond Holder Bail-in  
The model also allows assessment of other instruments and tools that dampen the effect of the 
bank-sovereign loop, such as the required bail-in under the BRRD and the establishment of a 
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resolution fund. According to the burden sharing cascade of the BRRD and SRM regulations, banking 
resolution needs to comply with the “burden sharing cascade”.  
In case of a severe distress, bondholders are supposed to bail-in the bank up to 8% of a bank’s Total 
Assets. Here, we consider the situation in which the domestic government recapitalizes bank to 8% of 
the RWA after banks bondholders provide direct recapitalizations. The first column shows that even if 
bondholders participate to the recapitalization of the banks the contribution of the local government 
remains sizable27, i.e. from 12 up to 39 Billion Euro, for peripheral countries (IE, IT, PT and SP). The 
8% bail-in of total banks’ balance sheets is effective in breaking the cycle only in the case of France 
and the Netherlands. 
Table 9: Banking Sector Shock and the Total Effect on Banks Losses and Sovereign Risk with the “Bail-In”. This table shows 
results of the analysis in which we estimate the total effect, accounting for the complete feedback loop, of a shock originating in the 
banking sector on both banks and sovereign credit risk.  The following information is reported: SYMBOL excess losses (99.95 percentile 
of the distribution) and the corresponding debt to GDP increments (relative to its initial value), sovereign risk premium shifts, haircuts 
and losses on sovereign holdings. The table aggregates per country the data for the considered 35 banks consolidated in the country 
of the parent. Public finances (i.e. domestic government) provide for the recapitalization up to 8% RWA after bondholders have provided 
direct recapitalization up to 8% of Total Assets. 
 
Banks excess losses + gov. recap to 8% (99.95 percentile of the distribution) 
 
   First Order Effect Total Effect 
  
Bank Excess 
Losses + Gov. 
Recap 
 Debt-to-
GDP 
Increment 
Shift 
Sovereign 
CDS Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign 
Holdings 
 
 Debt-to-
GDP 
Increment 
Shift 
Sovereign CDS 
Level 
Haircut 
Losses on 
Sovereign Holdings 
            
  Billion €  Bps  Billion €   Bps  Billion € 
DE  8,092  0,3% 0 0,0% 6,579  1,9% 32 4,7%  42,351  
 FR  1,252  0,1% 3 0,2% 4,032  1,0% 21 4,1%  19,965 
 NL  1,224  0,2% 3 0,3% 0,954  1,4% 19 3,7%   7,313  
 IE  13,047 8,0% 174 12,7% 6,026  16,1% 380 27,1%   13,405  
 IT   39,748 2,5% 52 3,9% 16,302  5,6% 114 11,0%  48,768  
 PT   12,7183 7,7% 219 14,4% 7,322  17,5% 500 31,2%  16,160  
 SP    37,958 3,7% 120 8,8% 21,497  9,3% 320 23,6%  58,044 
            
 
                                                 
27 Zedda and Galliani (2014) propose a computational approach to study the effects of the circular relation between bank and sovereign 
risk. Their analysis shows that the 8% bail-in of total bank balance sheets is effective in breaking the cycle, hence preventing contagion 
between banks. They focus their analysis on Belgium, Denmark, Greece, and the Netherlands.  
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Let us now compare the government and the bondholder recapitalization effort in the case of bail-in 
vs. no bail. Moreover, the first round and total effect on sovereign holding losses. 
Table 9: Government and bondholders recap effort and the first round and total effect on banks losses on Sovereign 
bond holdings. 
Banks excess losses + gov. recap to 8% (99.95 percentile of the distribution) 
 
  No  Bail-In Bail-in   No  Bail-In Bail-In   No  Bail-In Bail-In  
  
Symbol Excess Losses+gov. 
recap 
Diff. (Bond 
holders) 
 
Losses on Sov. Holdings 
(First round) 
Diff.  
Losses on Sov. Holdings 
(Total Effect) 
      Diff. 
 
  Billion €        Billion €   
DE  76,948  8,092  -68,855   38,996  6,579  -32,417   101,299  42,352  -58,947  
 FR  129,962  1,253  -128,710   32,897  4,032  -28,865   69,076  19,966  -49,110  
 NL  38,052  1,225  -36,827   13,571  0,954  -12,616   31,755  7,314  -24,441  
 IE  21,843  13,047  -8,796   10,578  6,026  -4,552   20,984  13,406  -7,578  
 IT  119,247  39,748  -79,499   50,974  16,302  -34,671   109,616  48,769  -60,847  
 PT  22,366  12,718  -9,648   12,453  7,323  -5,130   23,535  16,160  -7,375  
 SP  119,873  37,958  -81,915   67,404  21,498  -45,906   126,632  58,045  -68,587  
 Tot.   528,292  114,041  -414,250   226,874  62,715  -164,159   482,897  206,011  -276,886  
 
In the case of Italy for example the government effort would be of 119 Billion with no bail-in while 
only 29 Billion in the case of a bail-in. This means that bondholders contribute to the recap of the 
bank with 79 Billion. After the bail-in still something remains to be injected by the government. In the 
case of PT and IE these amounts are relatively low, i.e. 8,6 and 8,7 Billion, as in these countries banks 
are well capitalized with equity. For Italy and Spain the need for government intervention remains 
high, most likely because banks hold assets with high risk weight. Banks with the most risk assets are, 
by definition, the ones with the least bail in capacity. 
Due to the bail-in aggregate losses on sovereign bonds by banks reduce in the first round by 164 
while second round by 276 Billion. Hence, the bail-in has the effect of reducing both bank losses and 
the sovereign credit risk. Two points are noteworthy here. First, with the bail-in final losses on 
sovereign bond holdings are larger than initial bank losses 206 vs. 114, while with no bail-in losses 
on sovereign holdings are smaller 528 vs 482. This means that the bail-in is effective in reducing the 
initial government contribution, but notice that the loop remains active. Second, in the case of the 
bail-in, the total contribution of bondholders in the case of a systemic crisis in Europe is of around 
414 Billion. Part of these has to be considered as equity investment while a large part constitutes 
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losses. These losses enter in the system again as bonds are held by banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds, other financial institutions and is some cases by households. 
5.6. Takeaways from the model and the analysis 
Our model allows disentangling two different issues. First, the determinants of the initial 
“recapitalization need” (i.e. the trigger of the feedback loop). These are: (a) the “scale” of the aggregate 
shock to which the banking sector is exposed. (b) The “health” of the domestic banking sector (capital 
ratios, risk weighted assets, etc.) and the (c) size of the banking sector. The government fund injection 
depends on country-level banks’ Total Asset of which the losses are a proportion (i.e. TA to GDP). 
Second, the determinants of the feed-back loop, which are: the (d) strength of the public finances, i.e. 
debt-to-GDP (or Sovereign CDS), the (e) growth prospects of the economy (GDP growth rate and 
volatility) and (f) banks’ exposure to domestic sovereign credit risk (e.g. bond holdings), but also (g) 
the policy setting (ESM, SRM and Bail-in in place or not). 
Notice also that the shocks, the transmission (propagation) mechanism and the feedback loops 
(amplification) are three distinctive issues. We propose the following clarifying example. If a shock 
originates in the banking sector the government might potentially have to, or actually needs to do 
inject new funds to rescue them. Hence, when banks face large unexpected losses sovereign credit 
risk increases as well. This is the transmission mechanism. Given that the government in trouble now, 
banks will face new unexpected losses on their bond holdings. Then the government will have to recap 
again and so on and so forth.  As a final result due to the described feed-back loop banks risk will 
increase by a larger amount with respect to the initial increase (original shock), and sovereign credit 
risk will increase by a larger amount with respect to what caused in the first round. If the model would 
include also a third sector, i.e. the real economy the transmission mechanisms could be both direct 
and/or indirect.  In fact, when sovereign risk increases there is a direct effect on bank risk as already 
described above. Then there is also a direct effect on the real economy as the government might 
increase taxes to face debt repayment. But there is also an indirect effect to the real economy via 
banking sector, as when banks are in trouble they tend to reduce lending to the real economy. And 
there is also an indirect effect to banks as these suffer from a weaker economy. Feedbacks are now 
multiple as also troubles in the real economy, not only in the banking sector might feed back to the 
sovereign. 
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6. Final Remarks and Further Investigations  
The model provides a simple but powerful tool to analyse the bank-sovereign feedback loop and 
evaluate the effectiveness of policy options. Even though considering only the basic and most direct 
channels, the effects are sizeable. The Mody-Sandri framework that we start from is well suited to 
extend the analysis and include other feedback channels. Future work could focus in particular on 
feedback channels through the real economy. Also model parameters could be estimated, and the 
conditions under which an initial shock would generate explosive dynamics could be investigated.  
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Annex 1: Further tables. 
 
Table 1.1: List of 64 large EU banking groups, across 21 European countries, for which the EBA provides banks’ exposure amounts to 
sovereign debt. The focus of the bank vs. sovereign risk feedback loop analysis is on the following seven selected countries: DE, FR, NL, 
IE, IT, PT and SP. 
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Annex 2: Shock originating in the Sovereign sector 
In a second exercise, we analyses the impact of an adverse shock originating in the sovereign sector. 
We aim at quantifying the impact of haircuts applied on sovereign debt on banking losses and 
sovereign sector credit risk via the feed-back loop. We model the initial shock as an exogenous and 
unexpected shift of the level of the government credit spread term structure by 40%, for all euro-
area countries. As in the first step, bank unexpected losses in stress situations are generated by means 
of the SYMBOL model and are augmented with the losses realised on bond holdings due to the 
haircuts applied.   
Table 11: Joint Sovereign and Banking Sector Shock and the Feed-back Effect on Banks Losses  and Sovereign risk. This 
table shows results of the analysis in which we estimate the total effect, accounting for the complete feed-back loop, of a shock 
originating both in the sovereign and in the banking sector on both banks and sovereign credit risk. We take as an adverse scenario one 
in which the term structure of credit spreads of all Euro area government shifts unexpectedly by 40% (compared to the baseline where 
the term structure stays constant) and we work out the corresponding sovereign bonds’ haircuts.  The following information is reported: 
SYMBOL excess losses and the corresponding debt to GDP increments (relative to its initial value), sovereign risk premium, haircuts and 
losses on sovereign holdings. In table A Public finances (domestic government) provide for the recapitalisation up to 4.5% RWA while 
in Table B for the recapitalisation up to 8% of RWA. 
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Table 12: Joint Sovereign and Banking Sector Shock. This table shows the feed-back loop dynamics for the first 5 iterations, of a 
shock originating both in the sovereign and in the banking sector on: haircuts, debt to GDP ratios and shift in the sovereign CDS level. 
We take as an adverse scenario one in which the term structure of credit spreads of all Euro area government shifts unexpectedly by 
40% (compared to the baseline where the term structure stays constant) and we work out the corresponding sovereign bonds’ haircuts. 
Total exposure includes bond holdings of all worldwide governments. In table A Public finances (domestic government) provide for the 
recapitalisation up to 4.5% RWA while in Table B for the recapitalisation up to 8% of RWA. 
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Annex 3: Estimation of the IOPD, further details. 
For each exposure l in the portfolio of bank i, the FIRB formula derives the corresponding capital 
requirement needed to cover unexpected losses28 over a time horizon of one year, with a specific 
confidence level equal to 99.9% (see Figure 1): 
 
where  is the default probability of exposure l, ϱ is the correlation among the exposures in the 
portfolio, LGD is the Loss Given Default29 and M(PDi) a maturity adjustment 
 
and  
 
MCR of each bank is obtained summing up the capital requirements for all exposures:  
 
where   is the amount of the exposure l. 
The average IOPD of a bank’s asset portfolio can be derived as  
 
where  and A j,l are the minimum capital requirement and the total assets of the banks, publicly 
available in the balance sheet. 
                                                 
28
 Banks are expected to cover their Expected Losses on an ongoing basis, e.g. by provisions and write-offs. The Unexpected Loss, on 
the contrary, relates to potentially large losses that occur rather seldom. According to this concept, capital would only be needed for 
absorbing Unexpected Losses. 
29
 Set in Basel regulation equal to 45%. 
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